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LIFE INSURANCE RECEIPTS: THE MYSTERY OF THE
NON-BINDING BINDER
WHILE life insurance contracts are not ordinarily effective until delivery of
the policy.' it is common for insurance companies to issue so-alled binding
receipts. - The applicant obtains a receipt by paying his first premium at the
time of application. In return, the binder purports to extend coverage before
the policy is delivered.3 Since an application is merely an offer,4 revocable at
any time, insurance companies introduced the binder to protect themselves
from an applicant's possible change of mind.3 Such revocations result in out-
of-pocket losses to the company due to expenditures for medical examination
and investigation of the applicant.6 These losses, though individually small,
may be cumulatively quite substantial. Moreover, where the face amount of
the policy is small,7 such losses represent a proportionately large overhead
cost.S By securing payment in advance the company effectively avoids such
losses since the premium is generally sufficient to cover the company's costs.
Even if a revoling applicant is entitled to return of his payment the amount
involved is too small to make legal action worthwhile.0
1, VAxCE, INsuRaNcE §§35, 42 (3d ed. 1951). For a discussion of when delivery
occurs, see Patterson. The Dclivry of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 I=v. L RE%,. 198
(1919).
2. For general discussions of the problems raised by binding receipts, see Havighurst,
Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 IL.. L. Ray. 180 (1938); Wilkinson, Binding Re-
ceipts-Three Decades Later, 42 PROCEEaarhas OF Am. LrFr CoN h Nvano, Lu;atL SWrN0Ox
IS (1949); Comment, Operation of Binding Receipts in Life Insurance, 44 YAM .J.
1223 (1935).
3. Id. at 1224-5. For a collection of different binding receipt clauses used by various
companies, see Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 943, 960-2 nn.7-9 (1948).
4. VANCE, IxsuaR,.NcE 209 (3d ed. 1951).
5. Havighurst, supra note 2, at 180-1; Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 18; Comment, 44
YALE L.J. 1223, 122-4 (1935).
6. Even if the company can legally recover its loss, which it probably cannot, 1
CoucH, CYcLOPEDIA or IXsgRuXcE Lkxw § 93 (1929), the amount involved is too small
to justif, litigation.
7. Binding receipts are often used in connection with small policies, Comment, 44
YALE L.J. 1223, 1225 n.10 (1935), a fact which is reflected in the number of policies with
face amounts of under $1,000 appearing in litigated cases. See, e.g., Vestern & Southern
Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938) ($761 policy); Reck v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L. 444, 184 At. 777 (1936) ($1000 policy); Cheek
v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E.2d 115 (1939) ($125 policy); Colorado Life
Co. v. Teague, 117 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 193S) ($500 policy). In 1949 there
were 109 million industrial insurance policies in force with an average face value of $300
as compared with 65 million larger life insurance policies. Comment, Cost and Coverage
of Indatstrial Life Insurance, 61 YALE L.J. 46, 47 (1952).
8. For a general discussion of the effects of high overhead costs on industrial in-
surance policies, see id. at 49-54.
9. See note 7 supra. The amount paid in advance is generally under $100. Comment,
44 YALE L.J. 1223, 1225 n.10 (1935). Moreover, in some binders the applicant specifically
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Moreover, the binder reduces the likelihood of revocation by the applicant.
He may believe that he is protected from the moment he pays his first
premium, regardless of the exact terms of the binder. This sometimes un-
warranted 10 belief is often encouraged by agents' sales talks indicating that
coverage has already commenced." While, as a general rule, the binder
creates liability at some point prior to delivery,'2 its effect may not be as
sweeping as the applicant is led to believe.13
The use of life insurance binding receipts has not been subject to regula-
tion. While voluminous insurance regulations can be found in the statutes of
every state, 14 there are no clauses pertaining to binding receipts.ri Whatever
agrees to forfeit the amount paid if he revokes his offer. See, e.g., Albers v. Security
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 170 N.W. 159 (1918).
10. See pages 525-6 infra.
11. Havighurst, supra note 2, at 181. Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 39,
1 S.E.2d 115, 116-17 (1939), contains a frank statement of an agent to this effect: "I
tell the people this is something in force right now. . . . I tell them that most of the
time .... That is one of the biggest sales talks, that I am selling something that will
give them protection right now. That is what I emphasized to Mr. Cheek."
12. Even where recovery is denied, it is generally conceded that if the applicant is
in good health at the time the company approves his policy, the binder protects him
from that time until delivery of the policy. Cooksey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 Ark. 117,
83 S.W. 317 (1904) ; Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934).
13. See, e.g., Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E.2d 115 (1939) (re-
covery denied despite agent's statement). But cf. Mayfield v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 62
Mont. 535, 205 Pac. 669 (1922).
14. ALA. CODE tit. 28 (1940) ; 6 ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 66 (1947) ; ARz. Cot, c. 61
(1939); CAL. INSURANCE CODE (Deering, 1950); 3A CoLo. STAT. ANN. C. 87 (1935);
CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 42 (1949) ; 10 Dn. CODE ANN. tit. 18 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN,
tit. 35 (1941) ; GA. CODE ANN. tit. 56 (1935) ; 7 IDAHO CODE tit. 41 (1947); ILL. STAT.
ANN. c. 73 (Smith-Hurd, 1940); 8 INn. STAT. ANN. tit. 39 (Burns, 1952); IowA Coo
ANN. tit. 20 (1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. c. 40 (1949) ; Ky. REv. STAT. cc. 297-304 (1953);
15 LA. REv. STAT. tit. 22 (1950); 2 M. REv. STAT. c. 56 (1944) ; 2 Mo. CoDE ANN. art.
48A (Flack, 1951); MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 175 (1948); 17 Micu. STAT. ANN. tit. 24
(1943) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. cc. 60-8 (1945); Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 22, c. 3 (1942); 19
Mo. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, c. 376 (Vernon, 1952) ; 3 MONT. REV. CODE tit. 40 (1937) ; 3A
NED. REv. STAT. c. 44 (1952); 4 Nav. CorP. LAws § 3540 et seq. (1929); 2 N.H. REy.
LAws cc. 323-31 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 (1937); 5 N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 60
(1941) ; N.Y. INsuP ANcE LAW (1949) ; 28 N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 58 (1949) ; N.D. REv. CODE
tit. 26 (1943); 6 OIO GEN. CODE AN,,. § 9339 et seq. (Page, 1938) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36 (1951); 7 ORE. Co ip. LAWS ANN. tit. 101 (1940) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 (Pur-
don, 1930); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 150 (1938); 4 S.C. CODE tit. 37 (1952); 1 S.D. CoDE tit.
31. (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 14, c. 6 (Williams, 1934); Tax. INtSURANCE Core
(1951) ; 4 UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 31 (1953) ; VT. STAT. tit. 42, pt. III (1947) ; 6 VA. CODE
tit. 38 (1950) ; 8 WASH. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 45 (Remington, 1931) ; W. VA, CODE c. 33
(1949) ; Wis. STAT. cc. 200-10 (1951) ; 3 Wvo. Comp. STAT. c. 52 (1945).
15. See note 14 supra. Nor was insurance included among the regulated public call-
ings at common law. 3 HoLDswoRaT, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446-8 (4th ed. 1935).
The early English insurance law was, in fact, designed to protect the insurer because he
was to some extent at the mercy of the insured. PATTERSON, THE INsURANcE COMmIs-
SIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 245 (1927).
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legal restraints 10 exist are the result of a relatively recent body of case law.
But nearly a century of litigation between beneficiary and insurer has de-
veloped more confusion than regulation.
Conflicting Results and Theories
Insurance Co. v. Yozon's Adnz'r 17 has profoundly influenced binding re-
ceipt litigation. There the company had issued a binder, rejected the applica-
tion, and sent a different policy to the applicant, prior to his fatal injury. The
applicant did not accept the policy offered prior to death. The Supreme Court
found an offer by the applicant, rejection, an unaccepted counter offer and no
contract.' The binding receipt. terminated by rejection of the original appli-
cation, created no liability. The result in Younts Adinr, valid on its wn
facts, w.as followed especially in other early cases without regard to its appli-
cability to other fact situations. Later decisions ignored the fact that the
Supreme Court did not consider the effect of a binding receipt where death
intervened prior to the company's rejection."0 Thus, it became authority for
the proposition that an insurance company has an absolute right to reject
liability after the applicant's death.20
This doctrine met its first serious challenge in Starr v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of N. Y. In that case the company actually accepted the application a
few hours after the applicant's death. The beneficiary sued on a receipt stat-
ing that insurance was to be in effect "from date" if accepted by the Company
in its home office. Recovery was allowed on the ground that the clause was
ambiguous and must be construed against the company. 2
Ever since the Starr case broke with precedent, the legal effect of binders
has been increasingly in doubt. Recovery is apparently rejected on one
ground or another in Arkansas,2 Illinois,2 Iowa,2 ' Kentucky,2 Louisiana,-
16. Public relations considerations may exert some regulatory pressure. Comment,
Cost and Coverage of Industrial Life Insurance, 61 YA.LE L.J. 46, 58-9 (1952).
17. 23 Wall. 85 (U.S. 1874).
18. Id. at 106. For a very different approach to offer and acceptance in insurance
law, see Broidy v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1951).
19. See, e.g., Steinle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 4S9 (5th Cir. 1S97); Mohr-
stadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. 81 (Sth Cir. 1902); Cooksey v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 73 Ark. 117, 83 S.W. 317 (1904).
20. Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 19. For a collection of cases apply-
ing this rigid doctrine, see Havighurst, nipra note 2, at 182. This application of Young's
Administrator has been severely criticized. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 22-3.
21. 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).
22. Id. at 231-2, 83 Pac. at 117.
23. Cooksey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 Ark. 117, 83 S.W. 317 (1904).
24. Gerrib v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 256 IlL App. 506 (1930).
25. See Reynolds v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Iowa 76, 80-1, 176 N.W.
207, 209 (1920) (dicta states that on different facts recovery would be allowed).
26. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.A. 1026 (1911).
Accord, Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Maines, 191 Ky. 309, 230 S.V. 54 (1921). Contra:
Halle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 Ky. L.R. 740. 58 S.Wk. 82 (1900).
27. Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life, 152 La. 865, 94 So. 424 (1922).
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Minnesota, 28 North Carolina, 29 Oregon,30 West Virginia 81 and Wyoming.12
It appears to be allowed on a variety of theories in Alabama, s3 GeorgiaA
Indiana,35 Massachusetts, 36 Missouri, 37 Montana 8 New Jersey,89 Ohio,40
Pennsylvania, 4' South Dakota 42 and Washington. 43 And federal courts of
appeals are split, with earlier cases denying recovery, 44 and later ones allow-
ing it.4
5
The split in authority is made more dramatic by contradictory decisions
within Michigan, 46 New York,47 South Carolina 48 and Texas. 49 New York
28. Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 511, 216 N.W. 225 (1927).
29. Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E.2d 115 (1939).
30. See Francis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 55 Ore. 280, 291-2, 106 Pac.
323, 327 (1910) (dictum).
31. Kronjaeger v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 730, 22 S.E.2d 689 (1942).
32. Raymond v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. 1, 273 Pac. 667 (1929).
33. National Life & Accident Co. v. Clayton, 254 Ala. 413, 48 So.2d 180 (1950).
34. National Life & Accident Co. v. Moore, 83 Ga. App. 289, 63 S.E.2d 447 (1951)
Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Stonecypher, 54 Ga. App. 497, 188 S.E. 294 (1936),
But ef. Maddox v. Life & Casualty Co. of Tenn., 79 Ga. App. 164, 53 S.E.2d 235 (1949).
35. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938);
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Lottes, 116 Ind. App. 559, 64 N.E.2d 405 (1946).
36. See De Cesare v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 278 Mass. 401, 407, 108 N.E. 154,
156 (1932) (dictum that coverage commences only with acceptance of policy by the in-
surer).
37. Wolfskill v. American Union Life Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1142, 172 S.W.2d 471
(1943); Reed v. Prudential Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 90, 73 S.W.2d 1027 (1934).
38. Mayfield v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 62 Mont. 535, 205 Pac. 669 (1922) sctble.
39. Reck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L. 444, 184 Atd. 777 (1936).
40. Duncan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 441, 31 N.E.2d 88
(1940); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Howard, 18 Ohio Law Abstract 688 (1935). But cf,
Leube v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 450, 72 N.E.2d 76, 60 HAIV.
L. REv. 1164 (1947).
41. Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 187 Atl. 403 (1936).
42. Albers v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 170 N.W. 159 (1918).
43. Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905).
44. Steinle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 489 (5th Cir. 1897); Mohrstadt v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. 81 (8th Cir. 1902) ; Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73
F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1934).
45. National Life & Accident Co. v. Holbrook, 100 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1939) ; Gaunt
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849
(1947). In neither of these cases was the court's decision affected by Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), since there was no conclusive state ruling on the question.
46. Recovery allowed: N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Abromietes, 254 Mich. 622, 236 N.W.
769 (1931). Recovery denied: Smiley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 321 Mich. 60,
32 N.W.2d 48 (1948).
47. Recovery allowed: Hart v. Travellers Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 258 N.Y. Supp.
711 (2d Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1932). Recovery
denied: Coming v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 248 App. Div. 187, 288 N.Y. Supp.
661 (2d Dep't), aff'd without opiniot, 273 N.Y. 668, 8 N.E.2d 338 (1936). For other
New York cases see notes 51, 53, 54 infra.
48. Recovery allowed: Stanton v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 137 S.C. 396, 135 SE.
367 (1926). Recovery denied: Hyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 98, 190 S.E.
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with most cases has also achieved most confusion. The leading case of Hart
v. Travellers Ins. Co.r'" allowed recovery, and the next case followed suit."1
But Corning v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Almcrica. 2 and three succeeding cases
denied recovery.53 The most recent New York decision distinguished Corning
and its progeny, allowing recovery on tie authority of the Hart case." The
confusion in the other doubtful jurisdictions is only slightly less pronounced."
VERBAL AN"D FACTUAL CONTEXTS
Terms of the binder:
The result in a given case may depend in part on the binding receipt in
question. Although most receipts are similar in their overall provisions, their
exact terms may vary in as many ways as there are insurance companies."
These differences have been seized upon by several cuurts to explain conflict-
ing results in otherwise identical fact situations,5 and one courf has sugeieted
that because of these differences no case can be a binding precedent for any
other.5
Although binding receipts vary in their wording, commentators have classi-
239 (1937). See also Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., - S.C.--, 73 S.E 2d 62
(1952) (recovery allowed primarily on estoppel, but language in conflict with Hydcr
Case).
49. Recovery allowed: Colorado Life Co. v. Teague, 117 SAV.2d 849 (Te. Civ. App.
1938). Recovery denied: Beat)' v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.2d 895 (Te.,C. Civ.
App. 1930).
50. 236 App. Div. 309, 258 N.Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 563. 185
N.E. 739 (1932).
51. Buono v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America. 240 App. Div. 898. 267 N.Y. Supp.
972 (2d Dep't 1933).
52. 248 App. Div. 187, 288 N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dept), aft'd, .73 N.Y. 663, 8 N.E.2d
338 (1936).
53. Arcuri v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 248 App. Div. 501, 290 N.Y. Supp.
567 (lst Dep't 1936) ; Hughes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 254 App. Div. 570,
3 N.Y.S.2d 899 (2d Dep't 1938); Martin v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 58
N.Y.S.2d 84 (S. Ct. 1945).
54. Speronza v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, 272 App. Div. 770, 69
N.Y.S.2d 397 (2d Dep't 1947).
55. In none of these jurisdictions do the later cases satisfactorily distinguish the
earlier contradictory precedents, nor do, they disapprove them. See cases cited notes 51-4
supra.
56. In fact the same cumpany may use several binding receipt forms, each having a
different wording. Compare form used by the John Hancock Company in Duncan v. John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 441. 443-4, 31 X.E.2d 83, 90-1 (1940), ,ith
the form used by the same company in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169
F.2d 599, 600 n.1 (2d Cir. 1947). For a collectitn of varying binding receipts in current
use see Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 960-2 nn.7, 8, 9 (1948).
57. See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F2d 599, C92 (2d
Cir. 1947); Hyder v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 13 S.C. 98, 119, 190 S.E. 239, 248
(1937).
58. Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 10, 187 Atl. 403, 405 (193b).
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fled them within two main categories :09 the insurable risk type,p0 and the
approval type. The former ordinarily provides that if the applicant is insur-
able under the company's rules coverage commences when the first premium
is paid and the binder issued.6 1 Approval binders typically state that cover-
age commences from payment provided the company accepts the application
at its home office. 02 Either form effectively protects the company from a
change of mind on the part of the applicant.03 But writers have suggested
that only the insurable risk type protects the applicant in the interval between
completion of the application and issuance of the policy. 4 In the light of more
recent cases this assumption requires reexamination.
Fact situations in the cases:
Another theory advanced as explaining the apparent inconsistency of the
cases, is that they arise in several distinct factual contexts.0 Basically, three
distinct factual situations exist. The first arises where the company approves
the policy in ignorance of the applicant's death or other marked change of
condition, and later refuses payment. In the second the company makes a
counter offer or rejects the risk in ignorance of death or other marked change
in the applicant's condition.(0 The third, and most frequently litigated situa-
tion, 67 arises where death or other change occurs prior to any action by the
company, which then rejects the applicant on the basis of the post binder event.
59. Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 1223 (1935). While there are several variations of the
approval binder, they may be treated as one type. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 20. There
is a third type of receipt by which the company grants an unconditional temporary con-
tract of insurance for the interval between filing of the application and action on it by
the insurer. VANcE, INsURANCE 241 (1951). But this form is rare; and raises few legal
problems. Ibid.; see also GOBLE, CASES ON INSURANCE 44 (1949).
60. These are also called "satisfaction binders," PArrERSON, CASES ON INSUUANcr
629 (1947).
61. Typically the crucial part of this type of receipt states: "Insurantce subject to
the terms and conditions of the policy contract, shall take effect as of the date of this
receipt, provided the applicant is on this day . . . an insurable risk, and the application
is otherwise acceptable on the plan and for the amount and at the rate of premium applied
for.... ." Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 100, 187 Atl. 403, 404 (1936).
62. Typically, approval binders contain the following provision: "[W]hen such de-
posit is equal to the full first premium on the policy applied for and such application is
approved at the Home Office of the Company for the Class, Plan and Amount of insur-
ance applied for, then ... the amount of insurance will be in force from the (late of this
receipt .. " National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Moore, 83 Ga. App. 289, 63 S.E,2d
447,448 (1951).
63. Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 1223, 1225 (1935).
64. Id. at 1226; VANcE, CASES ON INSURANCE 143-5 (3d ed. 1940).
65. VANCE, CASES ON INsuRANCE 145-7 n.26 (3d ed. 1940).
66. VAN CE, op. cit. supra note 65, at 145-6, divides this class into two: one for counter-
offers and one for rejections. Since a counter-offer constitutes a rejection of the original
offer, Insurance Co. v. Young's Adm'r, 23 Wall. 85 (U.S. 1874), it is difficult to see how
this distinction can justify differing results.
67. See pages 530-1 infra.
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If the decisi~ns within the various types of factual situations are relatively
consistent, the apparent confusion is resolved into a matter of factual analysis.
_And if whatever conflict appears within a fact category can be explained by
a distinction between insurable risk and approval type binders, the situation
would be clarified. The cases will be examined to determine whether a
combination of both explanations removes the apparent conflict.
Company Accepts After Death
An insurable risk type binder probably protects the beneficiary where death
is followed by acceptance of the application. The company by its post-mortem
acceptance has confirmed the applicant as an insurable risk, thus satisf'ing
the sole condition of the binder." It is, therefore, difficult to see h.ow it coluld
deny liability. The total absence of litigation in this situation probably indi-
cates that even the less liberal companies are not inclined to challenge the
beneficiary's claim.
However, where "approval" binders are employed the result is less clear.
Some courts treat the binder as an offer by the applicant to the company.
They reason that the offer was automatically revoked because its subject
matter (the applicant's life) ceased to exist before the application was ac-
cepted by the company. 0 However, recent cases have generally allowed
recovery.7 1' These later cases apply two doctrinal approaches. First, the
binder effects coverage at the time of payment as otherwise the ccmpany iS
receiving payment for a period in which it assumes nu risk. 1 Second, the in-
tent of the parties was to effect coverage upun acceptance, retroactive to the
date of the binder.72
Good Faith Counter-Offer or Rejection
Where an insurable risk type binder is in effect, the company's subsequent
rejection or counter-offer has no legal effect if not communicated to the
applicant. The sole question is whether the applicant was insurable on the
date of the receipt.7 3 If he was not, then his beneficiary cannot recover;"
68. See binding receipt quoted note 61 itpra.
69. Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 6S9, b92 .8th Cir. 1S92) ; Braman
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391, 397 (Sth Cir. 1934).
70. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Moore, '3 Ga. App. 29, 63 S.E2d 447
(1951) ; Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Stonecypher, 54 Ga. App. 497, 18 S.E. 294
(1936); De Cesare v. Metropolitain Life Ins. Cu., 278 'Mass. 401, 1S0 X.E. 154 (1932);
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Abromietes, 254 Mich. 622, 236 N.W. 769 (1931) ; Albers
v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 170 NAV. 159 (1918).
71. Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (1905);
Albers v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra. note 70.
72. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Moore, 83 Ga. App. 2Z9, 292, 03 S.E2d
447, 448 (1951).
73. Reynolds v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 1S9 Iowa 76, 176 N.W. 207
(1920).
74. Ibid.; Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life, 152 La. 865, 94 So. 424 (1922).
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but if he was, the company cannot avoid liability.7 The protection that the
binder gives the insurable applicant is not terminated until he receives notice
of rejection. 76
Where an approval binder is issued, communication to the applicant of
rejection or counter-offer does not determine the result. Thus, a beneficiary
may recover although the applicant knew of a counter-offer.77 But the ma-
jority view allows the company to terminate liability by an uncommunicated
decision to reject the applicant. 78 This position permits the company to pre-
vent recovery by, in effect, talking to itself.79 A possible explanation for this
surprising doctrine may be that in cases where it was invoked the applicant
was not an insurable risk.80
Rejection Because of Interim Death
WNhere an applicant holds an insurable risk binder and the company rejects
the policy due to intervening death, recovery is generally allowed, absent
proof of non-insurability.8' But there is a dissenting view, expressed in
75. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938)
(applicant rejected because company doubted he would pay premiums); Stonsz v. Equi-
table Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 187 Atl. 403 (1936) (counter-offer); Stanton v. Equi-
table Life Assur. Soc., 137 S.C. 396, 135 S.E. 367 (1926) (rejection based on previous
alcoholism though presently insurable).
76. Ibid.; Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 187 Atd. 403 (1936).
77. Halle v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 22 Ky. L.R. 740, 58 S.W. 822 (1900) (counter-offer
subject of extended negotiations between applicant and company).
78. Leube v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 147 Ohio St. 450, 72 N.E.2d 76 (1947)
(temporary coverage created by binder and terminated by decision to reject) ; Mohrstadt
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. 81 (8th Cir. 1902) ; Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co.,
40 Wyo. 1, 273 Pac. 667 (1929); Corning v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 248 App.
Div. 187, 288 N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't 1936). It is rejected in National Life & Accident
Ins. Co. v. Holbrook, 100 F2d 780 (5th Cir. 1939) ; National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Clayton, 254 Ala. 413, 48 So.2d 180 (1950). Where the applicant knew of the rejection
or counter-offer, recovery is denied. Insurance Co. v. Young's Adm'r, 23 Wall. 85 (U.S.
1874); Kronjaeger v. Travelers Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 730, 22 S.E.2d 689 (1942).
79. For a concise criticism of this result, see Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1164, 1165
(1947).
80. See, e.g., Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. 1, 273 Pac. 667 (1929)
(applicant suffered from a stomach ailment). But see National Life & Accident Co. v.
Clayton, 254 Ala. 413, 48 So.2d 180 (1950) (beneficiary recovered although applicant was
discovered to have cancer a few days after medical examination). Misrepresentation by
the applicant as to his physical condition may be a further .reason for the rule of instant
termination. Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1164, 1165 (1947). And in at least one case the
court apparently regarded the binder as ineffectual in the first place. Mohrstadt v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. 81 (8th Cir. 1902).
81. Recovery is allowed on the theory that under this type of binder the company
cannot arbitrarily reject the applicant by hindsight if he was a satisfactory risk on the
date of the binder. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Lottes, 116 Ind. App. 559, 64
N.E.2d 405 (1946); Wolfskill v. American Union Life Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 1142,
1146, 172 S.W.2d 471, 472 (1943).
[Vol. 63 :523
LIFE INSURANCE RECEIPTS
Maddox v. Life & Casualty Co. of Tenwnssec.82 There the applicant, hnldin,
an insurable risk binder, died while the company was considering- his cage.
Despite the fact that a home office inspector had found him to he an insuralol'
risk, his beneficiary could not recover. The court, rejecting objective stand-
ards of insurability, argued that only an officer of the company could detcrmine
whether the applicant was insurable. Otherwise, reasoned the court, the a-,ent
would, in effect, be binding the company and this was beyond the sko,lc e of hi'
agency.'13 By superimposing the approval requirement upon an in-uralile
risk binder this court wipes out whatever difference there may he hetwevi,
them.
The results of post-mortem rejections involving approval binlers are even
more confusing. Roughly half of all binder receipt cases fall intn tiif catefuory.
The decisions are equally divided as to whether recovery sliul 1,e all, swel.'1
When the applicant is not an acceptable risk, cuurts read an insurable rizs
requirement into approval binders5 , Apparently feeling it uniair too -addle
companies with risks they would never approve, courts deny recovery where
the applicant was uninsurable. Even where the applicant is insural de, many
courts deny recovery on the ground that the company has not accepted the
applicant's offer.s6 However, more decisions, typified by Gaunt v. John Han-
cock,8S hold the company liable in this situation by construing an "ambiguity"
against it, or by reasoning that denial of recovery would be unconscionable s
82. 79 Ga. App. 164, 53 S.E.2d 235 (1949).
83. Id. at 173-5, 53 S.E2d at 241-2.
84. Recovery allowed: Reck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L. 444, 184
Atl. 777 (1936); Hart v. Travelers Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 2:-8 N.Y. Supp. 711
(2d Dep't), aff'd, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1932) : Duncan v. John Hancxk Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 550, 31 N.E.2d 88 (1940). Recovery denied: Xorthwlestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1026 (1911) ; Arcuri v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 248 App. Div. 501, 290 N.Y. Supp. 567 (1st Dep't 1936); Cheek
v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E.2d 115 (1939).
85. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1026 (1911).
If the applicant had been an insurable risk "we would have a very different questhn;'
id. at 573, 140 S.W. at 1031. See also Indiana National Life Ins. Co. v. Maines, 191 Ky.
309, 230 S.W. 54 (1921).
86. See, e.g., Beaty v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 28 SAV.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App
1930) ; Cooksey v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 73 Ark. 117, 83 S.W. 317 (1904). Recovery is
also denied because the binder's terms "require" this result. E.g., Hyder v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 183 S.C. 98, 190 S.E. 239 (1937).
87. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1947).
See also Duncan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 441, 31 N.E2d 8
(1940) ; Hart v. Travellers Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 258 N.Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't),
aff'd, 261 N.Y. 563, 185 N.E. 739 (1932).
88. Reck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L 444, 184 At. 777 (1936);
Reed v. Prudential Ins. Co., 229 Mo. App. 90, 73 S.W.2d 1027 (1934); Mayfield v.
Montana Life Ins. Co., 62 Mont. 535, 205 Pac. 869 (1922).
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Sunnnary
Generally an insurable risk binder protects the applicant so long as he has
not received notice of rejection or counter-offer.8 9 While recovery is not
certain on these binders, it is, with the exception of the Maddox case, denied
only where the applicant was not an insurable risk. 90 Insurable risk binders
form a small proportion of the cases, perhaps indicating that because of their
greater clarity, the questions of coverage under them are more easily settled
without resort to litigation."}1
The approval binder situation is less clear. It seems that an approval
binder will not help the beneficiary if the applicant was uninsurable.92 And
when there is an uncommunicated rejection the company is probably not
liable,93 although this may simply be another form of the requirement that
the applicant be an insurable risk. Where the company refuses payment
because of the applicant's interim death, his beneficiary has no more than
an even chance to recover. However, if the company accepts after death the
majority rule holds it liable.
Thus, the combination of the verbal and factual analyses does not dispel the
confusion. While insurable applicants recover under insurable risk binders,
they may or may not recover under the approval type. The fact situations are
irrelevant where an insurable risk binder is issued, and they are not controlling
in the approval binder situation. Thus, absent an insurable risk binder, it is
virtually impossible to tell whether a binding receipt actually binds.Y
RATIONALES OF RESULTS
Recovery Denied
f Denial of recovery on the ground that the applicant was not an insurable
risk,9" is not subject to criticism. Here the company would seem justified in
refusing payment since in no circumstances does it accept such applications.
Nor can it be argued that the deceased relied on the binder to his detriment,
because he would not in any case have been able to obtain insurance elsewhere.
But the offer and acceptance approach requires a logical leap of some pro-
portions. It equates the binder with the application as a mere offer, having
89. See pages 529-30supra.
90. See page 529 and cases cited note 74 supra.
91. Approximately one-fifth of the appellate cases involve insurable risk binders, al-
though they are probably issued as frequently as approval binders. VANCE, INSURANcE
239 (1951). Cf. PATTERSON, CAsES oN INSURANCE 629 (1949).
92. See pages 530-1 supra.
93. See page 530 supra.
94. Moreover, the tendency of some courts to change their minds encourages further
litigation even in a jurisdiction which has ruled decisively. For examples of judicial
vacillation, see notes 46-9 supra.
95. Reynolds v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Iowa 76, 176 N.W. 207
(1920); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1026 (1911).
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no effect until accepted by the companv. And acceptance after the applicant's
death is held ineffective since the offer was "revoked" at the moment (f
death . 7 The binder is issued for a separate consideration,08 not as a necessary
part of the application. It is difficult to see how the applicant's payment of
money in return for a recital of coverage can be an offer in any event. He
obviously is not offering to be insured, since his application does this regard-
less of whether he pays a premium in advance. If offer and acceptance must be
brought into the discussion, the shoe would .eem to fit hetter on the other
foot. The company states that if the applicant pays a premium with his appli-
cation it will advance the date of coverage. This offer the applicant accepl
by parting with his money.
Another theory reads the binder as a statement that liability will cnnmevlv
when the company accepts the application with the policy dating fr.: issuanwe
of the binder."-' Courts hold consideration for the applicant's pavmew i fIt iulI
in certain "esoteric" collateral advantages comprehensible only to under-
writers.'0 0 This line of reasoning is, however, out of step with reality. The
terms may have some meaning to a judge schooled in the fine print of inur-
ance clauses. But it is rather doubtful if the average applicant will realize that
the binder's apparent promise of immediate coverage doe., nut mean what it
says. If an applicant should question the effect of the binder, the agent may
tell him that he is protected "from now on."""' Furthermore, the ue of
96. Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 Fed. S1 (8th Cir. 1902); Beaty v. South-
land Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App 19,30); see Kronjaeger v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 730, 22 S.E.2d 689 (1942).
97. Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 73 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1934); Paine v, Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 6S9 (8th Cir. 1S92).
98. The payment of the first premium in advance is the consideration.
99. Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E2d 115 (1939); Corning v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of America, 248 App. Div. 187, 28 N.Y. Supp. 661 (2d Dep't 1936);
Smiley v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 321 Mich. WO, 32 X.W2d 48 (194S).
100. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947).
In this case the company suggested six "advantages" to the applicant that could result
from dating the policy from the binder without granting coverage. These were: (1)
earlier date of incontestability; (2) earlier maturity and acceleration of dividends and
cash surrender; (3) coverage between approval and delivery of the policy; (4) coverage
for the applicant even if he became uninsurable between completion of the medical
examination and approval of the policy (sic); (5) premiums at the lower rate if he
passed a birthdav between application and approval; (6) if the policy were written to
cover disability as well as death, the applicant would be protected against disability from
the binder's date. Id. at 601. The court dismissed these alleged advantages as insubstantial.
Id. at 602-03.
101. Statements of this nature appear repeatedly in the litigated cases. See, e.g.,
'Maddox v. Life & Casualty Co. of Tennessee, 79 Ga. App. 164, 53 S.E.2d 235 (1949);
Himes v. 'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 207 S.C. 40, 36 S.E2d 137 (1945). And see note
12 supra.
Since these statements are beyond the scope of the agency and are not authorized by
the company, the beneficiary of a deceived applicant cannot bind the company by them.
Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 N.C. 36, 1 S.E.2d 115 (1939); Bramau v. Mutual Life
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the words "binding receipt" appears calculated to induce in the applicant
an expectation of immediate coverage. 10 2 The collateral advantages may
constitute a minimal consideration.0 3 But the applicant is not getting the
one thing he is paying for-insurance. In view of the applicant's natural
belief that he is covered, refusal of recovery turns the binding receipt into
an instrument of dtceptlon. While the company demands premiums from the
date of application,-it grants coverage only from the date of approval.
Recovery Allowed
The theory allowing recovery by construing "ambiguities"'' 1" against insur-
ance companies is far from satisfactory. Its greatest defect lies in the uncer-
tainty it leaves as to binders with slightly different wording. This uncertainty
invites litigation. Company draftsmen search for an alchemy of words which
no court can find ambiguous. The small amount involved in many of tile
litigated cases indicates that even a victorious beneficiary may see the proceeds
of his policy virtually wiped out by costs and fees.10
A second theory of recovery finds the insured's payment of the premium
unsupported by consideration unless he obtains immediate coverage.' 0' But
the applicant does receive something, albeit of little value, for advance pay-
ment of the first premium. And courts, under traditional contract doctrine,
will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration. But the argument for
recovery emphasizes that only immediate insurance is important to the appli-
cant. Stating the result in terms of the inadequacy of collateral benefits as
consideration points up the basic inequity of denying recovery.
A more direct attack on this problem is made when courts allow recovery
because any other result would be "unconscionable. '10 7 This approach goes
to the heart of the problem by restricting the company's freedom of contract
Ins. Co., 73 F.2d 391. (8th Cir. 1934) ; Beaty v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W.2d 895
(Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Contra: Mayfield v. Montana Life Ins. Co., 62 Mont, 535, 205
Pac. 699 (1922).
102. See Cheek v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., supra note 101 at 39, 1 S.E.2d at 116.
103. Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract, 15 LAW & CONTrErP.
PRon. 376, 383 n.28 (1950).
104. Courts are sometimes willing to strain to find ambiguities. Schultz, supra note
103, at 379.
105. In one action the policy's total worth was $500, attorney's fee was $225, or 45%
of the face value. Colorado Life Co. v. Teague, 117 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938). Some state insurance statutes provide that the plaintiff may recover his costs and
fees plus a statutory penalty against the company if he wins his case. But such recovery
is usually limited to cases where the company's refusal to pay is frivolous. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. tit. 56, § 706 (1935).
106. Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 187 Atl. 403 (1936) ; Hart v.
Travellers Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 248 N.Y. Supp. 711 (2d Dep't 1932).
107. Colorado Life Co. v. Teague, 117 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Western
& Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 12 N.E.2d 350 (1938). "[I]t means that
by a device calculated to deceive, the applicant is defrauded out of so much of the premium
as would provide insurance. ... Id. at 610, 12 N.E.2d at 354.
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in the name of fairness.Y" It recognizes that insurance contracts are ti
generis.10  One assumption of freedom of contract is relative equality of
bargaining power. And another is workable competition among sellers, en-
abling buyers to shop around for the most favorable terms."10 In the binder
situation, however, the applicant has no equality or bargaining power with
the insurance company. Neither can he adequately compare the contents
of various insurance policies."' Since the basic assumptions underlying the
traditional unwillingness of courts to police contracts are ahsent, an approach
which provides protection of the applicant is essential.
CONCLUSION
In the more recent cases, there has been a tendency to allow recover . if
the applicant was an insurable risk, regardless of the type (of binder in questio on.
The stated grounds of recovery have varied, but the more flexible use of
doctrine, and the language sometimes employed, indicates increasing judicial
awareness of the necessity of protecting the applicant. 12 This trend toward
treating all binders as if they simply required that the applicant lie an insurable
risk is gradual. And some courts, perhaps believing freedom uf contract in-
violable, reject it.I13 Thus, the present confusion is not likely to dissipate
rapidly. Moreover, even in jurisdictions where the legal effect of binding
receipts appears settled, the social costs of litigation continue.
As tlings stand, only statutory control of binding receipts would atisfac-
torily protect the applicant and dispel prevailing confusiun. Legislatures have,
in the past been willing to enact regulations "1 for the protection uf the
insured."15
108. Divergent views as to the relative importance of frcedom of contract as com-
pared with the necessity of protecting the applicant may be the real basis of disagreement
among the courts. This theory has been put forward on several occasions. Kessler, Co:-
tracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Frccdom of Contract, 43 COL. L Pnv. 629
(1943); Schultz, supra note 103, at 377. Support for the view that the cleavage runs
along philosophical rather than legal lines may be drawn from uccasional judicial state-
ments. Ibid.
109. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389, 412-13 (1914). Life in-
surance is vital to many individuals as a form of security fur dependents, as a primary
collection of savings and as acceptable collateral for loans. Schultz, supra note 103.
110. Kessler, szpra note 108, at 630.
111. PATrFRSON, THE INSURANCE CuMIISSIONTER IN THE UNIrra STATES 246 (1927).
112. See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 692-03
(2d Cir. 1947); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Vale, 213 Ind. 601, 610, 12 X.E.2d
350,354 (1938).
113. See, e.g., Hughes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 Misc. 31, 297 N.Y.
Supp. 116 ('un. Ct. 1937): "[I]nterpretation of binder in favor of plaintiff would vio-
late the elementary principles of freedom of contractual rights." Id. at 35, 297 N.Y. Supp.
at 122.
114. See statutes cited note 14 supra.
115. Typical of regulations for the benefit of the applicant and his bLeficiary a-e
provisions regulating the use of representations or varranties of the applicant as grounds
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There are at least two statutory methods of protecting the applicant who
pays his first premium in advance. A compulsory binding receipt form could
be set forth.'1 6 The required terms would guarantee coverage to the insur-
able applicant from the date of payment until he receives notice of acceptance
or rejection." 7 An alternative statute would require coverage of the insurable
applicant who pays his premium in advance, regardless of whether a binder
is actually issued. In either case, an objective test of insurability should be
applied. Under this test the applicant is covered if a reasonably careful insurer
would have accepted him. A subjective test would allow the company to avoid
the effect of the statute by contending that it did not consider the applicant
insurable." 8  Since the facts bearing on such a contention are peculiarly
within the company's knowledge and control, it would be unfair to require
the beneficiary to disprove them.
While either statutory solution would be an improvement, the second k
the more satisfactory. A company should in fairness grant coverage if it pro-
tects itself by demanding payment in advance. But the company can avoid
liability under the "compulsory terms" statute by simply not issuing any
binder." 9 Moreover, if protection rests on issuance of a binder, the beneficiary
may lose because the agent neglected to offer a binder to his customer.
Thus, a model binding receipt statute should provide:
"Section X. a) Whenever an Insurance Company accepts payment of
the first premium on a policy of life insurance prior to the delivery of
said policy to the applicant, insurance shall be in effect from .the date
of such payment to the same extent as if the policy applied for had been de-
livered. Provided: that on the date of payment the applicant was in fact
an insurable risk under standards generally applied by reputable insurance
companies. Provided further: that an insurance company may terminate lia-
for avoiding liability. See N.Y. INsuRANCFc LAw §§ 149, 150 (1939). For a discussion
of the reasons behind the enactment of these sections see Note, 40 COL. L. REv. 880 (1940).
116. Eight sections of the New York Insurance Code provide standard provisions
for life insurance policies. N.Y. INSURANCE CODe §§ 155, 158-64 (1939).
117. At present, there is a tendency among insurance companies to issue binders of
this type rather than approval binders. Moreover, some companies treat approval binders
as if they were insurable risk binders. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 28.
118. For a discussion of the advantages of the objective test see Kessler & Ehren-
zweig, Misrepresentation and False Warranty in the llinois Inmurance Code, 9 U. or CHI.
L. RE V. 209, 213-14 (1942). For a defense of the subjective test see Note, 40 CoL. L. REv.
880, 887 (1940).
119. An additional advantage of the automatic coverage solution is that it settles the
oft-litigated question of the company's liability, absent a binder, for unreasonable delay
in acting on applications. Where the company fails to act promptly and the applicant
dies before delivery of the policy, some courts have strained tort and contract doctrines
to allow recovery. Others have refused to do so; there is little correlation between denial
or allowance of recovery in tort and the state's rule on binding receipts. The cases are
collected in Prosser, ZA av in Acting on an Application. fraIsnrnce, 3 U. OF Cn. L.
REv. 39, 41-3 (1935). The proposed statute protects insurable applicants who prepay their
premium against the company's tardiness.
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bility under this section by delivery to the applicant in his lifetime of notice
that his application has been rejected as to the policy applied for, and simul-
taneous tender of the amount paid.
b) This section shall apply regardless of whether or not the
applicant receives a receipt that purports to bind the company, except that
a company may provide temporary coverage for an applicant regardless of
whether the applicant was an insurable risk at the time of payment.
c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting any
defense an insurance company might have to liability, had the policy been
delivered."1 20
120. Sub-section a's first proviso prevents the company from being saddled with
poor risks. And it adopts an objective standard for determining whether the risk vas
satisfactory.
Sub-section b allows a company, if it so desires, to bind itself absolutely upon receipt
of payment in advance, rending action on the applicatikn.
Sub-section c preserves the company's right to interpose defenses it would have against
a delivered policy, such as material misrepresentation and lack of insurable interest.
